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REPRESENTATION AND EMBASSY PROTECTION

In this article, on the basis of his theoretical and practical experience, the author tried to outline briefly the main principles and rules of protection of important objects nowadays, when there is higher hazard of possible terrorist attack. His conclusions may significantly stand interested people in these problems from both professional and laical public in good stead, as a basis or „point of bounce“.

It can help significantly to specialists from this field.

Introduction

Nowadays, after well-known terrorist attack on New York “Twins“ there is a grow of terrorist actions all over the world mainly in connection with joining of Czech republic Army troops in allied fights in Afghanistan and Iraq, technical security and protection of important objects, for example workplace of “Free Europe“ in Wenceslas square or particular workplaces of our embassies, mainly in the countries of the “third world“, grows with great importance. Therefore it’s essential that specialists and professional public as well as firms and ordinary citizens in our country were familiar with the principles for necessary protection and defence of these objects.

1. General principles of object protection

Generally, technical protection can be mainly differentiated into spatial direction (peripheral, facial, spatial and subject protection), the way of handover the warning (the systems with local signalization, the autonomous systems, the systems with distant signalization) and the level of protection of protected object [6]:

1.1 Object hazard levels

- *Level 1 - low hazard* - households, recreational objects
- *Level 2 - low up to middle hazard* - shops with casual stuff (food, stationeries, ironmongeries, drug-stores,...), restaurants, libraries, production objects and halls
- *Level 3 - middle up to high hazard* - shops (electronics, needs for taking pictures, art subjects, antiques, chemicals...), museums, archives, chemists, important information
- *Level 4 - high hazard* - banking and deposit institutions, weapon and ammo shops, narcotic substances, state administration and self-government buildings (courts, police buildings, buildings of army - store rooms of weapons, ammunition, explosives...), government, senate, representation and embassy buildings.



Fig. 1 Illustration of object hazard levels

1.2 Object protection categories

1.2.1 Peripheral protection is determined by the perimeter of the object which mostly makes its cadastral border (fence). Instruments of the peripheral protection signalize the disruption of the object perimeter.

1.2.2 Facial protection is determined by the cover of the object (building). Technical instruments of the facial protection signalize the disruption of the object cover.

1.2.3 Spatial protection is understood as the protection of rooms, hallways and places inside the object. Technical instruments signalize or embarrass the disturbing of this protected place.

1.2.4 Subject protection avoids “attacking” or manipulation with the protected subject. There belong for example strongboxes, strain-gauge or capacity sensors etc.

Systems with local signalization are used in case of low hazard. Attacking the object is signalized by the electronic equipment by

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means of siren or light signalization which is placed directly inside the object or its imminent entourage. Autonomous systems have the signalization of electronic equipment loaded to the workplace with a non-stop service, for example to the security service. Then, the on duty worker reacts to the alarm signal either on his own or he calls the support (preferably The Police of the Czech Republic).

In respect of the systems with remote signalization, in principle it concerns telephonic or wireless transmission of alarm signal and alarm evaluation in the place with non-stop service with technical comfort (record of the event ancestry, graphic depiction of attacked object), with the sequence to hitting the group of security agency or to the action of The Police of the Czech Republic.

1.2.5 Physical protection – it concerns the object protection made by the security guards, members of the security service, police, army etc.

1.2.6 Regime protection – it involves administratively-organising disposals that have to focus on reservation of failure-free function of the whole safeguarding system (e. g. personal matters) [6].

1.2.7 Object protection organization ways:

Defence of the important objects is, under ideal conditions, usually organised in four areas. Border of *peripheral protection* is often delimited only with warning signs or another kind of letter of advice. The main sense of these disposals is to warn against the random entry to the protected zone. In some cases, the border of peripheral protection is made of the different mechanical barrier, mostly a fence, mechanical function of which is often supplemented by the technical devices that react to attempts to overcome or damage the fence. The area behind this border is monitored through the medium of different technical devices and sensors, eventually of secret or vice-versa demonstrative lookout. The aim of monitoring is detection of the disturbers and well-timed warning of the security guard. Territory is divided into several zones, where the physical protection operates according to the given system. Members of the guarding are equipped with the weapons and the tools which correspond to the conditions and necessities of their service. Means of *facial protection* are located on the outer walls of each building and in respect of the important buildings they are combined with the systems which monitor the entry. It concerns the components for the case mechanical becoming stronger, supplemented with the electronic components. The case is usually divided into several zones to precisely directed crackdown of the service against the disturber. *Spatial protection* protects individual places (rooms) inside the building. Means of the spatial protection are located only in the rooms where is the danger of attacking the low floors of buildings or in the rooms where the values are put. In this place means from all mentioned groups can be combined. *Subject protection* is concentrated on the only subject (strongbox, work of art). There exists a range of objects where the similar scheme of protection can't be simply used, e. g. in public buildings, banks, state administration buildings etc. In this case the protecting

system has to be built according to the requirements (e. g. peripheral protection is cut out) to be fully functional and concurrently to secure the required level of protection. The ability to react effectively to the attack if no warning information preceded, is the important criterion of the object protection functionality. This ability (protection system functionality) can be verified by the model situations which demonstrate the real attack.

1.3 Example of possible security of objects [5]

1.3.1 Example

The security of the object at the fenced land that obviously has the set aside outer border. The object is owned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (it's the embassy). This object is the enclave in the foreign country. Under normal conditions it's the object where the public can't enter, on the contrary, the object succumbs to the special operating regime. The employees, who work in the object, have to count mainly on themselves. For those reasons the highest attention must be paid to the security of this object.




Fig. 2 The plan of object foundation (cellar)




Fig. 3 The plan of object ground floor.

1st step lies in the thoroughgoing study of the real estate plans, with emphasis on land border, location of the building foundation, cellar places and the buried services. Then, all floors of the object must be perused. The same attention (which is paid to the study




Fig. 4 The plan of object first floor




Fig. 5. The plan of object roof I.




Fig. 6 The plan of object roof II




Fig. 7 The plan of object roof III



Fig. 8 View of the object from the north side



Fig. 9 View of the object from the south side



Fig. 10 View of the object from the east side

of the foundation and cellars) must be paid to the roof and attic places. On the basis of the plans it's important to interpret carefully the incorporation of the object into the terrain (unequal terrain, entrances, outdoor swimming pools, growth, neighbouring lands and objects, mainly the buildings overtopping the given object).



Fig. 11 View of the object from the west side



Fig. 12 View of the object roof

2nd step - after careful study of all real estate plans and thoroughgoing incorporation of the object into the terrain, we are able to determine exactly the peripheral, facial and spatial protection. In this step, it's decisive and principal to define mainly the peripheral and facial protection. It's obvious that in case of this object (with respect to its importance) we can't be satisfied only with caution lettering, possibly with the fencing as the mechanical barrier. It's important to gauge which special mechanical means to use for the protection of the object, e. g. special barriers, razor wire etc. Mechanical function of the fencing has to be strengthened by the technical means which will react to each attempt to overcome or damage the fencing. In respect to this object it's very important, within the peripheral and facial protection, to avail maximally the different classic and technical means, including the monitoring with the assistance of cameras, sensors, possibly to use

the hidden or vice-versa the demonstrative observing. The aim of these steps has to be the well-timed revelation of disturbers and concurrently the instant warning the security guard. Facial protection will be divided into several zones where the physical guarding will operate according to the given system. All steps have to keep the attacker in certain zone so that the crackdown is efficient. Members of the guarding can be equipped with the weapons and the means which will correspond to the conditions and the necessities of their service.




Fig. 13 Specification of the peripheral, facial and spatial protection

3rd step lies in the exact definition of spatial protection, it's necessary to determine which places will be protected and how. In this case the means of all mentioned groups, thus classic, technical, physical and regime protection, must be combined. Functionality criterion of protecting this object will be the ability to react effectively to attack of the object. It is therefore necessary to verify the operation of this protection on model situations which malingering the attack. In the case of the embassy or representation, there can be used completely atypical means of protection - sacks with sand, bullet-proof glass, armament store located usually in the object cellar, cipherring apparatus supplemented with self-destruction etc. To demarcate the circumference of spatial protection and determinate the most suitable way of securing, the plans and profile of the object will help us. All critical places come out well just on the profile: stairs, balconies, terraces, doors, windows, garages, cellars, roof, buried services etc.




Fig. 14 Object profile

Conclusion:

In my brief article I tried to summarize and outline the most important parts and principles of protection of significant objects, such as “objects important for state protection – OISP” or “objects

of possible attack – OPA”, so that it could be a reliable guidepost for professional and laical public who prepare security of important objects. This article is neither exhausting nor detailed study, but it’s only a survey of both theoretically and practically confirmed basic principles of protection of these objects.

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